Public International Law: An Anchor in Shifting Sands by Morrison, Fred L.
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 22 | Issue 2 Article 6
2004
Public International Law: An Anchor in Shifting
Sands
Fred L. Morrison
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Fred L. Morrison, Public International Law: An Anchor in Shifting Sands, 22 Law & Ineq. 337 (2004).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol22/iss2/6
Public International Law:
An Anchor in Shifting Sands
Fred L. Morrison*
Public international law provides an anchor in the sands of
international relations between States. It regulates their
interactions, moderates their conflicts, and resolves their
controversies. It creates mutual expectations that form the basis
for international peace and security. This modern international
law system is based on concepts founded in a long history of
customary and conventional law,1 now articulated in the Charter
of the United Nations. Its formative principles called for
recognition of the "territorial integrity" and "political
independence" of recognized States.2 Its security concepts were
based on collective security,3 and, if necessary, on individual and
collective self-defense. 4 It assumes that member nation states
would control all other actors-individuals and groups.
Over the past sixty years the United Nations has had a
remarkable record of improving world security in fields such as
human rights, environmental protection, and the codification of
international law.5  It has witnessed the expansion of the
international community of states from 39 Charter signatories to
nearly 200 member States today.6
International law is not, however, an immutable body of
rules. It is a living system. Like all living systems, it reacts to its
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1. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38., June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
3. Id. arts. 39-49.
4. Id. art. 51.
5. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June
16, 1972, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev 1, 11 I.L.M. 1416; CODIFICATION DIV.,
U.N., THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
http://www.un.org/law/1990-1999/index.html (last modified Nov. 19, 2002).
6. For a list of signatories to the U.N. Charter, see Press Release, United
Nations, List of Member States, http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last
modified Apr. 24, 2003).
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environment. The international legal order has responded
remarkably to the changes of the past half century. It has
responded to a concern for human rights first in declarations, 7
then in treaties and conventions binding on ratifying signatories,8
and finally in the growing consensus that minimum standards of
human rights have become customary international law.9 Part of
that change, as exemplified by treaties and conventions, has been
formal and within the constitutive rules of the international
system. Other changes have resulted from "pushing the envelope"
of rules of recognition of new international norms, essentially
creating a new Grundnorm, or basic validating rule for
international law. ' 0
The law governing international trade and finance exhibits a
similar range of development. From a near anarchy regarding
trade and finance, the States of the world created the
International Monetary Fund (IMF),11 the World Bank, 12 and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system 13 in the
late 1940s. They have created an orderly system, but not a fixed
order. By the 1970s, the International Monetary Fund had to
respond to economic and political forces that had ruptured the
fixed exchange rate system conceived in Bretton Woods and new
structures had to be established. 14 Those new structures emerged
7. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
8. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. See
also the more specialized agreements such as the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, G.A. Res. 2106
(XX), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 20378, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13;
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, G.A. Res. 24841, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
9. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia, Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13).
10. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27) (documenting International Court of Justice's use of the U.N. Charter as
evidence of customary international law).
11. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60
Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 29.
12. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank of Reconstruction and
Development, Dec. 20, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Jan. 1, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 308.
14. Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
July 28, 1969, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 20 U.S.T. 2775.
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in response to the changed facts of global economic life. 15 To
remain within the changed realities of the world, the original
organization and its rules had to change. If the IMF had insisted
on compliance with the specific terms of its organic instrument,
the IMF would have become irrelevant to reality and eventually
extinct.
The present turmoil of the World Trade Organization reflects
the same forces. For more than forty years the law of
international trade was a series of explicit economic "bargains," 16
continually subject to revision, reinterpretation, and occasional
non-compliance. Its evolution into an increasingly formal body of
binding rules and formal dispute resolution systems may have
taken place before the participating actors were ready to make the
necessary transformations in their own approaches to these
questions.
International law has always evolved to cope with the
environment in which it operates. The clearest statement of this
evolution is to be found in the work of Grewe, Epochs of
International Law.' 7 A diplomat and scholar, Grewe traces the
changes in perception in the legal order through a dozen different
epochs from the Sixteenth Century to the Twentieth Century.' 8 A
feudal world had a code of international norms that was
appropriate to and influenced by the economic and political
realities and rivalries of its time. 19 In another era, the claims of
the legal order were appropriate to the balance of power of that
era, and the rules of the system reflected that fact.20
Grewe recognizes that international law is fluid. It responds
to the political environment in which it exists. Although the
changes in the rules and expectations between epochs may be
fundamental, and even the Grundnorm of the system may change,
there is never a complete repudiation of the previous system, only
a reinterpretation of it. Some earlier norms are reinterpreted,
15. See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND
EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1982).
16. Robert E. Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J. 1299, 1302-04 (1971).
17. WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers
trans., Walter de Gruyter 2d ed. 2000) (identifying two epochs of international law
in the twentieth century: an interwar period from 1918-1945 and a post-World War
II system based on the U.N. Charter).
18. See generally id. The. introductions to each of the twelve epochs serve as
examples of evolution in legal order from the Sixteenth Century to the Twentieth
Century. Id.




while others quietly become irrelevant. New expectations of State
conduct arise. To take just one example, in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries the presence of a legitimate royal Head of
State was a precondition to membership in the order of States. 21
With the emergence of the United States and republican France at
the end of that period, the requirement of royal legitimacy, which
had been a bulwark of the old order, ceased to have real
relevance-any Head of State sufficed. 22 The earlier requirement
of royalty was never repealed; it was simply denied.
23
The final era that Grewe described, the international system
of 1945-1990, can be described in two ways: first, as it was
originally intended;24 and second, how it operated in fact.25 Before
his death, Grewe recognized that, with the close of the Cold War,
that system was coming to an end and a new era would appear.
26
He was able to make only some very preliminary efforts at
identifying what would follow.
How was the system of 1945-1990, the system we commonly
call "international law," supposed to work? As planned by its
framers, the system of the Charter largely confined protection of
international security to the major powers-the five permanent
members of the Security Council.27 This is confirmed not only by
Article Thirty-nine of the Charter, which affirmatively gave the
power to the Council, 28 but by other provisions of the Charter as
well. For example, the General Assembly was prohibited from
even debating security issues,29 regional organizations could only
act with Security Council approval, 30 and the Secretary-General
had a weak position. 31 The real purpose of this structure was to
permit the major powers to recognize and stop any dispute among
minor powers that could blossom into another world war, but to





24. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
26. See GREWE, supra note 17, at 715.
27. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (6th ed. 1992).
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
29. Id. art. 12.
30. Id. arts. 52-53.
31. Id. arts. 98-99.
32. See GREWE, supra note 17, at 645-46, 697-98.
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Two critical assumptions formed the basis of that structure:
first, States, and only States, were significant actors in the
international system;33 second, a balance of power required the
States to act in concert. 34 The outbreak of the Cold War put those
assumptions to the test. The exigencies of the circumstances
required reinterpretation of Charter provisions to maintain a
functioning international order. So, despite the clear language of
the Charter requiring an "affirmative vote" of every permanent
member of the Security Council for actions under Chapter VI, 35
that body successfully claimed to have authority even when one of
the permanent members did not in fact cast an affirmative vote,
but merely abstained or was absent.3 6  Despite the clear
commitment of all authority over peace and security, the General
Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace resolution, 37 claiming for
itself at least some authority in this field. And the second
Secretary General, Dag Hammerskjold, expanded his own
authority and presence into the vacuum left by the stalemate of
the Cold War.38 These interpretations are commonly lauded today
as measures of liberal interpretation that saved the organization
from the strictures of its organic law.39 But they are, indeed,
interpretations or evolutions of the international legal order.
These examples are provided to show that the law is and
must be malleable. Even the law of 1945 was interpreted to make
it suitable to a Cold War world. A static system in the early 1950s
would have doomed the United Nations to failure. International
law must accommodate itself to changing circumstances, and can
do so only through progressive interpretation.
The Cold War was a bipolar time, a time in which mutually
assured destruction preserved a balance of terror. But it was also
a time of great stability. The two competing powers knew their
mutual limits. They pressed thus far-and no farther. And each
of the superpowers could control or influence the activities of their
allies (or client States) to assure that the bounds thus described
33. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34., June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
34. See STEPHEN RYAN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 30-
31 (2000).
35. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 2.
36. John Quigley, The United Nations Security Council: Promethean Protector or
Helpless Hostage, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 129, 164 (2000).
37. G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/377(v) A (1950).
38. See generally RYAN, supra note 34, at 63-70 (chronicling Hammerskjold's
tenure as Secretary General).
39. Id. at 70.
2004]
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were not exceeded. 40
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended.
The world breathed a sigh of relief because the threat of a nuclear
holocaust seemed to have been abated. But while the
international community celebrated, the fundamental
assumptions upon which the entire superstructure of international
law of the latter half of the twentieth century had been built also
crumbled.41  States ceased to be the sole formulators of
international relations, and the number of actors capable of major
international mischief suddenly multiplied.42 With that change,
much of the foundation for the received learning of the
international law of the previous century also failed. The world no
longer consisted only of state actors; other entities had an
increasing presence in the international community. And
individual actors, States or not, had tremendous power to alter the
course of events through the A-B-C weapons-atomic, biological,
and chemical-the fabled "weapons of mass destruction." These
actors could dissolve any semblance of order created by the
international system.
Let me address these points one at a time. First, I turn to
the rise of non-State actors. The premise that only States were
relevant actors, and that all international problems could be
resolved by interactions of State entities, served as the basis of the
traditional international legal order.43 In 1900 or 1950 that was
probably true. There were no real transnational economic or
military activities of any significance. The only significant
transnational political movement was international communism, 44
which after 1918 became so dominated by the Soviet Union that it
conformed to the model of State-directed activities. Although
communism and the Soviet Union were formally distinct, the State
system, through the influence of the Soviet Union, could control
the activities of the international communist movement.45
40. The Cuban Missile Crisis provides the best example of this brinksmanship
and the diplomatic maneuvering of the two superpowers.
41. See GREWE, supra note 17, at 701-03.
42. Examples of such groups include the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan, other
middle-east terrorist groups, rebels in El Salvador, drug cartels in South Africa,
and also the rise of multinational corporations that no longer are clearly subject to
the control of a single state.
43. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34, 59
Stat. 1055, 1058 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) (stating the traditional view).
44. Although fascism was also an international movement, it was more closely
identified with its State sponsors, Germany and Italy, than communism was
identified to the Soviet Union.
45. See, e.g., VON GLAHN, supra note 27, at 171-72 (discussing Soviet Union's
[Vol. 22:337
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By 2000 this was no longer true. States were simply no
longer capable of exercising the kind of control they once did. To
start with a relatively benign example, no single nation State can
now effectively control the activities of the largest transnational
corporations. In the 1950s, the General Motors' President said,
"[wihat's good for the United States is good for General Motors."46
It was an U.S. company, with U.S. goals. Today's Daimler-
Chrysler is a much more ambiguous entity. Whatever its formal
legal structure, it is an economic actor in the international arena,
controlled mostly by its economic situation and the financial
markets.47 Neither the United States nor Germany nor the
European Union can fully exercise control over it. Daimler-
Chrysler can shift production and activities among its many sites
to achieve maximum financial return.
More importantly, in the political area, States are no longer
capable of controlling activities within their borders sufficiently to
preserve international security. On one hand, we see a range of
States that are so weak, corrupt, or ineffectual that they cannot or
will not control aberrant action.48 On the other, a revolution in
transportation and communication have deprived the State of the
effective tools to control individual and collective activity. So we
see the growth of political ideologies and movements that are not
centered in one particular state. AI-Qaida is the best known
example of this issue. It is a multi-national group, not controlled
or controllable by any one State in the region. Yet September 11th
shows us the magnitude of harm that Al-Qaida is able to inflict. A
Brezhnev Doctrine, under which the Soviet Union claimed the right to intervene
when it perceived a threat to socialism in any socialist country). See also GREWE,
supra note 17, at 656-57.
46. Two Wilson Hearings Before Senate Committee on Defense Appointments,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1953, at 8. See Federal Statistical System Before the
Subcommittee on Government Management, Restructuring and the District of
Columbia, 104th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Vincent P. Barabba), 1997 WL
10569311 (explaing that former General Motors President Charles E. Wilson made
this statement during Senate confirmation hearings for his appointment as
Secretary of Defense in response to a question about his willingness to take action
adverse to General Motors if the decision was in the interest of the United States.)
Wilson stated that he could make such a decision and could not conceive of a
conflict because "for years I thought what was good for our country was good for
GM and vice versa." Id. This statement is often misquoted in the inverse. Id.
47. See Daimler-Chrysler, Company at a Glance, at
http://www.daimlerchrysler.com/dccomlO,,0-5-7155-1-12898-1-0-0-0-0-0-8-7155-0-0-
0-0-0-0-0,00.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004) (summarizing Daimler-Chrysler's
operations worldwide).
48. Somalia and Liberia are the most prominent examples of States that lack
effective governmental structures and thus also lack the ability to control the
actions of such groups.
2004]
Law and Inequality
state that limited its response to Al-Qaida to polite diplomatic
notes to Yemen, or Saudi Arabia, or Afghanistan, calling for action
to limits its harmful activities, would be deceiving itself in the
name of maintaining a traditional international order.
The reality of AI-Qaida and the ineffectiveness of Mullah
Omar's Taliban regime in Afghanistan in controlling it made the
traditional State-centered system irrelevant. In order for the
United States to protect its domestic security in New York,
Washington, and elsewhere, it could not rely upon the government
in Kabul to react. It had to react itself, and did so.
Another part of the radical change is the emergence of the
"single superpower," the United States. 49 The system of the
twentieth century was based upon the notion that the balance of
power, or the balance of terror, between the United States and the
Soviet Union would keep the peace. The structure of the United
Nations and the actual conduct of international affairs reflected
this notion. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United
States emerged, at least temporarily, as the only State able to
preserve world order. The United States has taken on that
mantle, but with obeisance to the traditional international order.
The United States justified its involvement in Kosovo in terms of a
regional response, and the United Nations only validated the
intervention after the fact.50 The United States officially justified
the invasion of Iraq to the United Nations as a resumption of the
1991 war in light of the failure of Saddam Hussein to comply with
all of the conditions upon that armistice. 51 Thus, the United
States argued that it needed no further authorization because the
invasion had already been properly authorized by the Security
Council.52 These were the necessary obeisances to the traditional
legal standards.
The political realities driving these decisions were not the
legal niceties of the justifications, but something much more
important-response to the changing political environment. The
term "weapons of mass destruction" captures this change. Those
weapons in the hands of a power (whether a State or a private
group) could make the rest of the legal system quite irrelevant.
49. See GREWE, supra note 17, at 701.
50. U.N. SCOR 1244, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10,
1999).
51. CONG. RES. SERV., IRAQ WAR: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES OVERVIEW 37 (Apr.
15, 2003), available at http://usembassy.state.gov/pretoria/wwwfcrla.pdf (last
visited Feb. 27, 2004).
52. Id. at 37.
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The "sole remaining superpower" is concerned about challenges
not only to itself, but to the existing system of international
relations. "Weapons of mass destruction," or large military forces,
would have made Saddam Hussein's Iraq a player capable of
altering the international legal and political order. Such changes
would not have enhanced human rights or other goals of the
international community. The recent developments with regard to
Libya 53 provide additional support for this proposition, as do the
continued discussions with North Korea. 54 There may be nothing
more sinister here than a natural attempt to preserve the existing
world order, a natural reaction of all systems.
While the United States is currently the "sole superpower," it
is unlikely to remain so permanently. Other States may pass the
threshold to become participants in that process. In a sense,
China already is well on its way in that direction. The United
States has clearly courted Chinese acquiescence in recent events,
55
and has relied upon China to take a lead in the difficult.relations
with North Korea. 56 New balances and equilibria will be found.
When found, they will rely upon reinterpretations of the basic
rules of international order that are pertinent to the new reality.
International norms will remain, but they will be reinterpreted
and reapplied.
At the beginning of this Essay, I said that international law
is an anchor in the sands of the sea. If the winds, currents, and
tide are strong, and an anchor is set in sand, it will slowly drag
along the bottom. The boat will slowly move, and its point of
reference will slowly change. It may drift to the shore, but it will
have a "soft landing" there. If, on the other hand, an anchor is set
in granite, which some might prefer, it will keep the boat in a fixed
position, until the sea and wind become too great for the anchor
line, whereupon the boat will suddenly break free and crash upon
the rocks, shattering it to bits. An anchor set in sand is perhaps
preferable.
We are seeing a process in which the changing international
environment is inducing some subtle changes in the international
legal order, but that order dampens and controls these changes. It
is a natural part of the dynamic process called international law.
53. Libya Ratifies Nuclear Treaty, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2004, at A18.
54. Christopher Marquis & Norimitsu Onishi, North Korea Agrees to Resume
Talks With U.S. Over Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2004, at A4.
55. David E. Sanger, Bush Lauds China as 'Partner' in Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2003, at A6.
56. Id.
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